Busuu — Storybook postMessage XSS chained to 1-click Account Takeover

Authorized security research PoC. Target: storybook.busuu.com + api.busuu.com
Chain
1. PostMessageTransport on the Storybook preview accepts updateStoryArgs from any origin — no event.origin check.
2. The href arg of a Link story accepts a javascript: URI ⇒ script execution in the storybook.busuu.com origin.
3. api.busuu.com grants that exact origin Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true — an allowlist, not reflection ⇒ the XSS is the required key.
4. The same grant permits POST/PUT/DELETE ⇒ updateUserProfile changes the victim's e-mail. UpdateUserProfileInput has no password field ⇒ no re-authentication is possible.
5. Password reset to the attacker's address ⇒ full account takeover.
Safety. This PoC is non-destructive. It reads profile data, proves the schema has no password parameter, and issues the e-mail write as a no-op using the account's own current address, so nothing is modified. It does not change, delete or exfiltrate anything.
Delivery note. The target opens in a top-level popup, not an iframe. In an iframe storybook.busuu.com is a third-party context and the SameSite=Lax session cookie is not attached, so the credentialed request returns 401 UNAUTHENTICATED and the chain appears to fail. The popup keeps it first-party.